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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20010012-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Priority No. 2

LEE WALKER,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for securities fraud, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-l-21(2)(b) (1993), and
money laundering, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903
(1990). Because defendant has not been sentenced, this Court does not have jurisdiction (see
point I below). However, should the Court find that there is a final, appealable order, it has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Does this Court have jurisdiction to consider this appeal where the trial court has

never sentenced defendant?

1

Standard of Review. Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law which
can be raised at any time. See Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54,116, 982 P.2d 572; Olson
v. Salt Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986).
2.

Does the provision under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995) that a defendant

may not receive a double reduction in the degree of his conviction without the prosecutor's
consent violate the principle of separation of powers under article V, section 1 of the Utah
Constitution?
Standard of Review. Interpretation of the Utah Constitution is a question of law which
this Court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.
See State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, f 19, — Utah Adv. Rep —.
3.

Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's convictions for securities

fraud and money laundering?
Standard ofReview. The Court affords great deference to the jury verdict and will not
reverse a conviction unless "the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable
[minds] could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980).
4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a

mistrial based on the prosecutor's question, to which an objection was sustained, as to
whether defendant told the victim that defendant had been convicted of a felony?

2

Standard of Review. A trial court's ruling on a motion for a mistrial based on
prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68,
H 18, 8 P3d 1025.
5.

Did the trial court commit plain error in not instructing the jury that it had to

unanimously agree on the manner in which defendant committed the fraud?
Standard of Review. To show plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that "(0 an
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant." State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
6.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in the manner by which it selected the

alternate juror?
Standard of Review. A trial court's removal of jurors is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Cf State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, f 58,20 P.3d 342 (reviewing a trial court's forcause dismissal of a prospective juror for an abuse of discretion), cert denied, — U.S. —,
122 S.Ct. 542 (2001).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are relevant to a
determination of this case: Utah Const, art. I, § 10; Utah Const, art. V, § 1; Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-1 (1993); Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21(2) (1993); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1990). The relevant portions of the foregoing provisions are
reproduced in Addendum A.
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Defendant was charged with securities fraud, a felony punishable by a fine of up to
$20,000 and imprisonment of up to ten years, or in the alternative, communications fraud,
a second degree felony; communications fraud, a second degree felony; theft, a second
degree felony; and two counts of money laundering, both second degree felonies. R. 25-27.
Following a preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound defendant over for trial on securities
fraud and the two money laundering counts. R. 40-42, 69, 72-73; see also R. 406-07.
Defendant moved to quash the bindover, which the trial court denied. R. 78-88,123-25. At
the time of trial, one of the two money laundering counts was dismissed. See R. 458-59.
Following a three-day trial, a jury convicted defendant as charged. R. 425, 488-90, 495.
The trial court stayed sentencing and instead simply placed defendant on supervised
probation for 36 months, subject to a $ 100,000 liability in restitution to the victim. R. 477-79
(Addendum B). Defendant appealed, but whereas the court had not sentenced defendant, this
Court dismissed the appeal for lack ofjurisdiction because "there [was] no final, appealable
order." R. 484, 532-33 {State v. Walker, 1999 UT App 241) C Walker I, Addendum C).
Defendant moved for a new trial under rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
moved to arrest judgment under rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. R. 539-53; see
also R. 497-504. The trial court found that the motions were timely, but denied the relief
requested and entered an order denying the two motions. R. 556-64. Defendant filed a
notice of appeal one day after the 30-day appeal period expired. Compare R. 563 with R.
4

565. This Court also dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. R. 578-79 (State v.
Walker, 2000 UT App 148) (Walker 11, Addendum D).1
On August 31, 2000, more than eighteen months after being placed on probation,
defendant moved for a double reduction of his convictions to misdemeanors pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995). R. 583-613. The trial court granted defendant's motion in
part, reducing the securities fraud felony conviction to a class A misdemeanor and the money
laundering conviction to a third degree felony. R. 626-28 (Addendum E); see also R. 619-25.
The court terminated supervised probation, placing defendant on bench probation, and denied
defendant's request to reduce the restitution amount. R. 626-28. The court, however, still
did not sentence defendant. See R. 626-28. Defendant filed a notice of appeal twenty-three
days later. R. 630.2 Contending that there was still no final, appealable order because
defendant had not been sentenced, the State also moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. This Court denied the motion, holding that the amended judgment" constituted
a final, appealable order (Addendum F).

defendant had filed another notice of appeal nine days after the trial court entered
an amended order submitted by defendant. R. 570-74. However, this Court concluded
that the amended order related back to the original order and the successive notice of
appeal did not therefore cure the untimely appeal. See R. 578-79. The Court did not
address the State's claim that the Court lacked jurisdiction because defendant had still not
been sentenced.
2

Two months after the notice of appeal was filed, an order that substantially
reflected the amended judgment was also entered by the trial court. R. 636-37.
5

SUMMARY OF FACTS 3

In the late 1980s, defendant Lee Walker—an attorney in Las Vegas—became a patient
of Lance Hatch, a Salt Lake City chiropractor. R. 488: 213-14. Although defendant lived
outside Salt Lake City, he came in for visits when he was in town on business. R. 488: 21314. Over the course of several years, the two became friends—meeting socially and even
operating a network marketing company together. R. 48 8:221,235. When Hatch retired and
moved to St. George, the two stayed in touch. See R. 488: 214, 235-36.
In October 1994, after Hatch had moved to St. George, defendant telephoned Hatch
about an investment opportunity involving David Smith, a client of defendant's in Florida.
R. 488: 214, 216-18, 236. He also faxed Hatch a "Memorandum of Understanding" which
served as the investment contract for investors. R. 488: 216,223; see also R. 489: 57.4 The
contract called for an investment of $100,000 and promised to pay the investor, through the
sale of "Prime Bank Instruments/' an amount "equal to three point seven five (3.75) times
his investment" within 45 days after receipt of the investment transfer. SE2 (Addendum G).
Defendant told Hatch that the investment was "okay" and solicited Hatch's help in finding
investors, telling him that "it wouldn't hurt anything to show people." R. 488:217,220,223;
see also R. 489:115. When Hatch balked at the idea because the only people he could really

3

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v.
Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, f 2, 37 P.3d 1180 (citing State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, \ 2, 994
P.2d 1237).
4

The parties at trial stipulated that the investment contract constituted a security
under Utah law. R. 488: 279-80.
6

approach were friends, defendant assured him that Smith was someone he could trust and the
investment was, in his estimation, "okay." See R. 488: 218-20.
After speaking with defendant, Hatch approached three of his friends about the
investment opportunity, including his neighbor Marc Sorenson. R. 488: 214, 222. Hatch
approached Sorenson about the investment when Sorenson came to his home to visit Hatch
and his family. R. 489: 49; R. 488: 223. During the course of the visit, Hatch told Sorenson
about the "lucrative" investment opportunity defendant had discussed with him. See R. 489:
49, 51-52, 60, 106; R. 488: 223, 238. Lamenting that he did not have the money to invest
himself, Hatch told Sorenson that he was passing the information onto him because
defendant told him that it was a good deal and he knew defendant to be trustworthy. See R.
489: 52,106; R. 488:223-24. Hatch reassured Sorenson that he had worked with defendant
and that he was a "very legitimate guy." R. 489: 58. He explained that he had been
defendant's chiropractor and that defendant had always paid his bills on time. R. 489: 58.
Interested, Sorenson asked Hatch to explain more about the investment and to put him in
contact with those involved. R. 489: 49, 52; R. 488: 224.
Because defendant had also represented to Hatch that the funds needed to be received
within a short period of time, perhaps a week, Hatch believed there was a certain urgency in
making any investment. R. 488:226-27. Thus, after explaining the investment to Sorenson,
Hatch telephoned defendant in Las Vegas. R. 488: 225. Hatch again sought defendant's
assurance that the investment was sound and queried defendant whether he had looked into

7

it as an attorney. R. 488: 226. Hatch also obtained Smith's telephone number so that
Sorenson could speak with Smith. See R. 488: 224.
After his initial discussion with Hatch, Sorenson further explored the investment,
talking with both Hatch and David Smith. R. 489: 57,119; R. 488: 241; see R. 488: 241-44.
In telephone conversations involving Smith and Hatch, Sorenson was told that a $100,000
investment would yield, within a short period of time, a $275,000 return on top of the initial
investment. See R. 489:49,51-52. Smith and Hatch explained that Walid Summa, a foreign
national living in Michigan, wanted to transfer one billion dollars into Bear Steams &
Company, Inc. R. 489: 50,119; SE1&2. They explained, however, that the funds could not
be legally transferred to the Bear Steams account directly and thus a secondary account of
at least $500,000 was required for investors. R. 489: 66-67. Smith gave Sorenson firm
assurances that his $100,000 investment would be safe and that he would receive a return on
his investment as promised. R. 489: 112.
Sorenson also spoke with defendant in a conference-type call with Hatch. R. 489: 5455, 102; R. 488: 228-29. During that call, the three reviewed the investment contract. R.
488: 228-29.5 Hatch and Sorenson also asked defendant whether the contract was legal and
whether it was "something that would be advisable to get involved in for Mr. Sorenson." R.
488: 229. Defendant vouched for Smith's credibility, calling him "a legitimate credible
investment guru," and represented that "this was probably a, a viable situation[—t]hat this
5

Sorenson testified that defendant did not explain the investment opportunity—he
did not discuss Walid Summa's role or the return Sorenson should expect to receive, nor
did he offer to sell Sorenson a security. R. 489: 102-03, 114.
8

investment was okay." R.489:113; R. 488:229. He explained that Smith had been involved
in many such investment transactions, that he and Smith had been together for some time,
and that he could therefore vouch for his credibility. R. 489: 55-56.
Although defendant had been sentenced to prison for a criminal contempt conviction
relating to a securities violation, and was subject to a permanent injunction enjoining him
from "engaging in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security," he did not disclose these facts to either Sorenson or Hatch. See R. 489: 98-100;
R. 488: 233. At trial, the State's expert witness testified that such legal action is important
information to the average investor in making a decision to invest. See R. 488: 285-86,293,
295-96. Hatch concurred, also explaining that had he known about it, he would have
disclosed it to Sorenson. R. 488: 233, 250.
After speaking with Smith and defendant, Sorenson signed the investment contract
pledging the transfer of $100,000 to the accounts of Bear Stearns and David Smith. R. 489:
57-60; SE1&2.6 Hatch suggested that Sorenson transfer the funds through defendant's trust
account in Las Vegas. R. 489: 60, 114; R. 488: 231. He reasoned that defendant's
willingness to use his trust account in this way would (1) add assurance that the investment
was legitimate, and (2) ensure that the funds were properly transferred. See R. 489: 60,114;

6

Sorenson actually signed two investment contracts. R. 489: 47-48, 57. The latter,
which was signed two days after the first, directed that the $100,000 investment be
distributed as follows: $50,000 to the Bear Stearns account in New York and $50,000 to
David Smith's account in Palm Beach. Compare SE1 with SE2.
9

R. 488: 231, 245, 247. When this transfer was arranged, defendant told Hatch "that this
whole thing had better be good because he didn't have enough malpractice insurance to cover
the problem." R. 488: 245. On October 18, 1994, Sorenson transferred $100,000 to
defendant's trust account, whereupon $50,000 was transferred to Smith's account in Florida
and $50,000 was transferred to the Bear Stearns account in New York. R. 489: 58-60; R.
488: 301-02.
Unbeknownst to Sorenson, "there [i]s no such thing" as prime bank instruments and
"any use of them [is] illegitimate and fraudulent." R. 490: 468, 477-78. Indeed, their
emergence in the early 1980s prompted the Federal Reserve Board in October 1993 to issue
a public alert warning against the use of suchfraudulentinstruments. R. 490: 481-83. The
high rate of return promised is generally a distinct clue to potential investors that the
investment is in fact "too good to be true." See R. 490: 480.
Not surprisingly, Sorenson never received any of the promised payments, losing his
entire investment. See R. 488:311. Sorenson repeatedly attempted to contact defendant for
an explanation, but defendant never returned his calls. R. 489: 62-63. Sorenson was able
to talk to two men from New York who acknowledged receipt of $50,000, but that contact
proved fruitless. R. 489: 61; R. 488: 311. Sorenson later learned that the day after the
$50,000 transfer into Smith's account, which theretofore had a zero balance, Smith drew a
check from the account for $34,782.95 for the purchase of a Jeep Cherokee. R. 489: 103; R.
488: 305-06. Despite an investigation, disbursement of the funds transferred into the Bear
Stearns account could not be traced. R. 488: 302.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Jurisdiction. Defendant has never been sentenced. This Court dismissed
defendant's first appeal because defendant had not been sentenced. Nearly sixteen months
after the Court dismissed the first appeal, the trial court entered an "Amended Judgment" to
reduce the degree of the original convictions. However, the court still did not sentence
defendant. Because the sentence is the final order from which a defendant may appeal his
conviction, this Court lacks jurisdiction and should dismiss the appeal.
II. Constitutionality of Section 76-3-402. Defendant claims that because section
76-3-402 permits a trial court to reduce a conviction by two degrees only if the prosecutor
assents thereto, it violates the principle of separation of powers. However, defendant's
argument is wholly devoid of legal analysis. He does not discuss Utah's constitutional
provision governing the distribution of governmental powers, he does not discuss Utah case
law addressing that provision, he does not discuss the decisions of other jurisdictions, and
he does not explain why the statute violates the separation of powers doctrine. Because
defendant has not adequately briefed the issue, this Court should decline to review it.
Nevertheless, a review of Utah case law addressing the separation of powers doctrine reveals
that section 76-3-402 does not violate the Utah Constitution.
III.

Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Defendant argues that the evidence was

insufficient to convict him of securities fraud and money laundering. However, when the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, it cannot be said that the
evidence was insufficient. Defendant, an attorney, invited his long-time friend to find people
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to invest in an investment opportunity involving one of his clients. He also faxed his friend
a form investment contract which promised a 375% return in 45 days involving the sale of
"Prime Bank Instruments." When his friend balked at the idea, defendant assured him that
his client could be trusted and reiterated that the investment was "okay." The friend
approached the victim in this case about the investment opportunity and arranged a telephone
conversation with defendant. During the conference call, the three reviewed the investment
contract. The friend and victim asked defendant whether the contract was legal and whether
it was an advisable investment. Defendant again vouched for his client's credibility and
represented that it was probably a viable investment. When the victim agreed to make the
investment, defendant allowed the funds to be transferred through his trust account and
acknowledged that he would be responsible. Unbeknownst to the victim, there is no such
thing as a "Prime Bank Instrument" and any use of them is illegitimate. Defendant also
failed to disclose that he was subject to a permanent injunction restricting his involvement
in securities transactions and that he had previously been sentenced to prison for a criminal
contempt conviction relating to a securities violation—facts which would be important to the
average investor. These facts support the jury's verdict.
IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct Defendant claims that the prosecutor's question to
the victim as to whether or not defendant had ever told him that he had been convicted of a
felony constituted prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal. While defendant's conviction
was not a felony, any possible prejudice was cured when the prosecutor rephrased the
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question after defendant's objection. The trial court did not therefore abuse its discretion in
denying the motion for a mistrial.
V. Jury Unanimity. Defendant claims that the trial court failed to properly instruct
the jury on the requirement of unanimity.

Because defendant did not object to the

instructions before they were read to the jury, he cannot prevail on appeal absent plain error.
He has shown no error, much less plain error. The instructions as a whole can be fairly read
to require the unanimity defendant contends the law requires. To the extent the instructions
were insufficient, that insufficiency was not obvious. Moreover, under the Sullivan rule, the
jury was not required to be unanimous in the manner in which defendant committed security
fraud, as alleged by defendant.
VI. Alternate Juror. Defendant contends that the trial court did not comply with the
rules of criminal procedure when he designated the third juror in order as the alternate juror,
rather than the ninth juror in order. However, this Court need not address whether or not the
trial court departed from the rules because defendant has not demonstrated any prejudice.
Defendant has not alleged on appeal that any member of the jury was partial or that the trial
court acted with improper motives. Moreover, defendant passed the jury and the alternate
juror for cause at trial. This Court will not reverse a jury conviction where, as here, the
alleged error is harmless.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THIS
APPEAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOT SENTENCED
DEFENDANT
The Court has already denied a previously filed motion by the State to dismiss this
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Order (Addendum F). However, because "a lack of
jurisdiction can be raised at any time by either party or by the court," Olson v. Salt Lake City
School District, 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986), the State renews its claim that the Court
lacks jurisdiction and urges the Court to revisit the issue.
* * *

"In criminal cases, the sentence itself is thefinaljudgment from which an appeal can
be taken." State v. Hunsaker, 933 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah App. 1997) (per curiam).
Accordingly, until the trial court sentences a defendant, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider any claim on appeal because there is no final, appealable order. See State v.
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978) (holding that "[i]t is the sentence itself which
constitutes afinaljudgment from which [an] appellant has the right to appeal").
Dismissal of First Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction. Although a jury convicted
defendant of securities fraud and money laundering, R. 425, the trial court did not sentence
defendant. Instead, the court entered the following judgment:
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JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY FOUND, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the
Defendant, LEE E. WALKER, is guilty of the offenses of COUNT I:
SECURITIES FRAUD, a felony punishable by a fine of not more than $20,000
and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years and COUNT II, MONEY
LAUNDERING, a second degree felony.
STAY OF IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the
imposition of any sentence in this matter is stayed.
ORDER OF PROBATION
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said
Defendant, LEE E. WALKER, is hereby placed on supervised probation for
a period of thirty-six (36) months, strictly within the following terms,
provisions and conditions:
1. That the Defendant be liable for One Hundred Thousand Dollars
($ 100,000) in restitution to Marc Sorenson jointly and severally with any other
defendant convicted of a crime in connection with the fraudulent activities
resulting in the loss of Marc Sorenson's money; provided that, the Defendant
shall not be required to pay any money toward restitution until after any trial
and sentencing of any convicted defendants;
2.

That the Defendant cooperate fully with Adult Probation and Parole;

3. That the Defendant have no business activities involving the sale of
securities and that the Defendant not participate in any manner in any
transaction involving the offer or sale of securities to any third person; and
4.

The Defendant have no law violations.

R. 477-79 (emphasis added).
Defendant appealed, but this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. R.
532-33 (Walker I, Addendum C). Relying on Hunsaker and Gerrard, this Court held that
"[bjecause Walker ha[d] not been sentenced, there is no final, appealable order, and [the
Court thus] lack[ed] jurisdiction to consider his appeal." Id. The Court's dismissal of
defendant's first appeal was without prejudice, thereby permitting defendant to file "a new,
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timely notice of appeal after the trial court enters a final appealable order. Id, (emphasis
added).
Amended Judgment: No Sentence Imposed. One year later, defendant moved for a
reduction in his convictions under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995). R. 583-613. The trial
court granted defendant's motion in part, amending the original "judgment" as follows:
AMENDED JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY FOUND, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the
Defendant, LEE E. WALKER, is guilty of the offenses of COUNT I:
SECURITIES FRAUD, a class A misdemeanor and COUNT II: MONEY
LAUNDERING, a third degree felony.
ORDER OF PROBATION
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
supervised probation is terminated and that Defendant, LEE E. WALKER, is
hereby placed on bench probation for the balance of the original thirty-six
month term under the following conditions:
1.

That the Defendant commit no law violations; and

2. That the Defendant pay restitution as previously ordered, until the
issue of restitution is resolved.
R. 627 {see Walker II, Addendum D). Defendant appeals from this "Amended Judgment,"
claiming error in both the trial court's partial grant of the motion for reduced convictions,
Aplt. Brf. at 19-24, and the trial proceedings, Aplt. Brf. at 24-46.
As in the first judgment, the trial court did not sentence defendant. Neither did the
court sentence defendant in the interim. Accordingly, this Court still lacks jurisdiction to
consider defendant's appeal. See R. 533, Walker I (holding that because sentence had not
been imposed, the Court "ha[s] no alternative but to dismiss Walker's appeal for lack of
jurisdiction"); see also Hunsaker, 933 P.2d at 416.
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The failure of the trial court to impose any sentence stems from that court's apparent
misunderstanding of its sentencing obligations and probation authority. After the dismissal
of the first appeal for lack of a final, appealable order, defendant moved for a new trial and
to arrest judgment. R. 539-53. In rejecting the State's claim that the motions were untimely,
the trial court frankly acknowledged "that '[Defendant] has not been sentenced.'" R.
558-59 (emphasis added) (Addendum H). The trial court noted and rejected the prosecutor's
argument that the "court's order staying the imposition of sentence was, in spite of the clear
language of the order, actually the imposition of sentence." R. 557-58. The court instead
concluded that it was not required to sentence defendant. R. 557-59. The court explained
that Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(2)(a) (1995) "gives the [trial] [c]ourt discretion to suspend
imposition of sentence and place a defendant on probation without imposing sentence

"

R. 557 (emphasis added). The court concluded that section 77-18-1 was in conflict with rule
22(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the trial court to impose sentence
and enter a judgment of conviction after a verdict. R. 558. However, the court "assume[d]
that the conflict between the rule and the statute was inadvertent," and thus "interpreted]
Rule 22(c) to mean that the Court 'shall impose sentence or order a suspension of the
imposition of sentence.'" R. 558-59 (emphasis added).7

7

The trial court ultimately denied the motions, but again took no action to sentence
defendant. See R. 556-61. Defendant attempted to appeal, but this Court dismissed that
appeal because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. R. 578-79 (Walker II,
Addendum D). Under Walker I, however, dismissal of the second appeal was also
required because there was still no final, appealable order.
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The trial court misinterpreted the law. As conceded by the trial court, rule 22(c)
provides that "[u]pon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose
sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict,
if any, and the sentence." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c) (emphasis added). This requirement is
consistent with the mandates of the Criminal Code, which provides that "[a] person adjudged
guilty of an offense under th[e] code shall be sentenced" as provided by law. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-101(1) (1999) (emphasis added). Once sentence has been imposed, section 7718-1 permits the court to "suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the
defendant on probation." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(2)(a) (1999). When read this way, no
conflict exists between the rule and the statute.

Indeed, this is the only reasonable

interpretation of the two provisions. A sentence cannot be suspended until first it has been
imposed. The foregoing procedure is consistent with the standard practice of Utah courts.
See, e.g., State v. Allen, 2000 UT App 340, f 2,15 P.3d 110 (sentencing defendant "to one
to fifteen years in prison for the aggravated assault and six months in county jail on the other
charges, but suspending] the sentence, ordering that defendant serve 36 months probation
and pay restitution to his victim for her counseling and associated costs"); State v. Kenison,
2000 UT App 322, f 4,14 P.3d 129 ("sentencing] defendant to not more than five years in
prison on each count, but suspending] his incarceration, ordering instead that defendant be
confined to the Salt Lake County jail for nine months and that he then be placed on probation
for 36 months"); State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App.) (sentencing defendants to
jail, but suspending their sentences pending successful completion of probation), cert.
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denied, 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997); State v. Eaton, 701 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1985)
(sentencing defendant to a prison term, but suspending execution thereof and placing
defendant on probation); State v. Dowell, 517 P.2d 1016, 1016 (Utah 1974) (sentencing
defendant to maximum prison term, but suspending her sentence and placing her on
probation).
When the trial court entered an "Amended Judgment," it did not depart from its
previously stated position. The court never sentenced defendant, but simply granted
defendant's motion for a reduction in the degree of his convictions and terminated supervised
probation. See R. 626-28. Because the court did not sentence defendant, there is still no
final order from which defendant may appeal. See Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 886. Accordingly,
as with the first appeal, this appeal should be dismissed "without prejudice to the filing of
a new, timely notice of appeal after the trial court enters a final appealable order." See R.
533 {Walker I). In the event this Court finds it has jurisdiction, defendant's convictions
should be affirmed for the reasons below.
II.
SECTION 76-3-402fs PROVISION THAT A DEFENDANT MAY NOT
RECEIVE A DOUBLE-REDUCTION IN THE DEGREE OF HIS
CONVICTION WITHOUT THE PROSECUTOR'S CONSENT DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
Section 76-3-402 provides that upon a defendant's conviction, the trial court may,
under defined circumstances, "enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of
offense and impose sentence accordingly." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995)(1). Section
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76-3-402 also provides that "[a]n offense may be reduced only one degree under this section
unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense
may be reduced two degrees." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(3) (1995). On appeal, defendant
asks this Court to consider whether this latter provision requiring the prosecutor's consent
for a double reduction violates the principle of separation of powers.
A,

DEFENDANT HAS NOT ADEQUATELY BRIEFED THE ISSUE.

Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that the argument "contain
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented." Thus,
"rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority
and reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah
1998); accord State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, \ 27, 989 P.2d 503. In other words,
parties may not treat the appellate court '"simply [as] a depository in which [a] party may
dump the burden of argument and research/" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah
1988) (quoting Willamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. App. 1981)). Yet, that is
exactly what defendant does here.
Defendant's argument expends some four pages in quoting nearly the entire trial court
decision refusing to grant more than a single reduction in the degree of his convictions. See
Aplt. Brf. at 19-22; see also R. 619-24 (memorandum decision, Addendum I). Following the
lengthy recitation of the trial court's decision, defendant gives a superficial overview of such
general concepts as the "rule of law," "structural independence," "decisional independence,"
and the need for judicial independence. Aplt. Brf. at 22-24. He then concludes his argument
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by "requesting] that this Court review this issue and consider how it pertains to the principle
of the separation of powers in the Utah Judiciary." Aplt. Brf. at 24. This is the extent of
defendant's argument. He does not explain how section 76-3-402 violates the general
concepts of structural, decisional, or judicial independence. He does not identify or discuss
article V of the Utah Constitution—the constitutional provision that defines the distribution
of powers in Utah government. He does not cite to or discuss any decisions from this Court
or the Utah Supreme Court which address article V or the principle of separation of powers
in Utah government. Nor does he discuss the decisions of other jurisdictions touching this
subject. In short, defendant's argument is "devoid of legal analysis" on the issue, see State
v. Price, 827 P.2d 247,249 (Utah App. 1992), but nevertheless invites the Court to determine
on its own "how it pertains to the principle of the separation of powers in the Utah
Judiciary," Aplt. Brf. at 24.
At best, defendant's brief can be read as adopting the conclusions of the Arizona and
California cases cited favorably by the trial court below. See R. 621-23 (discussing State v.
Jones, 689 P.2d 561 (Ariz. App. 1984); State v. Prentiss, 786 P.2d 932 (Ariz. 1989); and
People v. Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1990)). In those decisions, the Arizona and California
courts concluded that statutes permitting reduced sentences only at the invitation of the
prosecutor violated the doctrine of separation of powers under their respective state
constitutions. See Prentiss, 786 P.2d at 936 (rejecting such statutes under the rationale that
"the legislature cannot, through an executive agent, restrict the judiciary from deciding what
a sentence should be"); Jones, 689 P.2d at 563 (holding that "the decision to mitigate a
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sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor"); Tenorio, 473 P.2d at 996-97
(holding that a recidivist statute that permitted a court to disregard a prior conviction only at
the bidding of the prosecutor improperly infringed on the judiciary's sentencing discretion).
Defendant, however, does not explain why the rationale of those courts should be applied in
Utah. He also fails to recognize the holdings of other jurisdictions which would suggest that
section 76-3-402 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. See, e.g., United States
v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89 (2nd Cir. 1989) (holding that federal statute permitting downward
departure from minimum sentence only upon motion of the prosecutor doesriotviolate the
separation of powers doctrine), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1046, 110 S.Ct. 845 (1990); State v.
Pierce, 657 A.2d 192 (Vt 1995) (holding that statute conditioning any deferral of a criminal
sentence on the prosecutor's approval does not violate separation of powers doctrine); State
v. Gonzalez, 603 A.2d 516 (NJ. Super.Ct.App. 1992) (holding that statute permitting waiver
of mandatory sentence only upon prosecutor's approval does not violate separation of powers
doctrine). In short, his argument contains no analysis explaining why this Court should adopt
the conclusions of Arizona and California.
Defendant also fails to address the "serious doubts" of the trial court "as to the
viability of the separation of powers principle" in light of recent Utah cases. See R. 623.
Although the trial court found that the rationale of the Arizona and California courts was
"very sound and persuasive," it refused to find that section 76-3-402 violated the separation
of powers doctrine under the Utah Constitution. R. 623.
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Where a party fails to adequately brief an issue on appeal, this Court has routinely
declined to consider that issue. See State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998);
accord Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304. Defendant has not adequately briefed the separation of
powers issue, neither discussing Utah's jurisprudence on the subject nor explaining why the
Court should adopt the conclusions of Arizona and California. Because his brief "wholly
lacks legal analysis," State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989), this Court should
decline to address defendant's claim.
B. SECTION 76-3-402 DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE V, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.

Even if this Court were to consider defendant's claim, it would fail on its merits.
Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others,
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
Utah Const, art. V, § 1. "The first [clause] states the general separation of powers principle,
and the second very specifically prohibits the exercise of certain functions of one branch by
one charged with the exercise of certain powers of another branch." In re Young, 1999 UT
6,atf 7,976P.2d581.
The Utah Supreme Court applies the following three-step inquiry in determining
whether a statute violates the constitution's separation of powers principle:
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First, [is the person] in question "charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to" one of the three branches of government? Second, is
the function that the statute has given the [person] one "appertaining to"
another branch of government? The third and final step in the analysis asks:
if the answer to both of the above questions is "yes," does the constitution
"expressly" direct or permit exercise of the otherwise forbidden function? If
not, article V, section 1 is transgressed.
In re Young, 1999 UT 6, at f 8. The Supreme Court has concluded that "for powers or
functions to fall within the reach of the second clause of article V, section 1, they must be 'so
inherently legislative, executive or judicial in character that they must be exercised
exclusively by their respective departments/" Id. at f 14 (quoting Taylor v. Lee, 119 Utah
302, 315, 226 P.2d 531, 537 (Utah 1951)) (emphasis added). In other words, "when the
power exercised or the function performed is one t h a t . . . is not exclusive to a branch, it is
not 'appertaining to' that branch and does not fall within the reach of the second clause of
article V, section 1." Id. Because "there are many cases in which the duties of one
department are to a certain extent devolved upon and shared by the other," In re Young, 1999
UT 6, at Tf 13 (internal quotes omitted), the critical question in most inquiries is the
second—whether the powers or functions delegated in the statute "appertain[] to" a different
branch of government.
In this case, the question is whether the prosecutor's role in approving a doublereduction in the degree of a defendant's conviction is so inherently judicial in character that
it must be exercised exclusively by the judiciary. See In re Young, 1999 UT 6, at \ 14. Even
a brief review of cases from this and other jurisdictions suggests that the prosecutor's role
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under section 76-3-402 is not so inherently judicial in nature that it may only be exercised
by the courts.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that no one other than a duly appointed judge can
enter final judgments or impose sentence. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 848, 851
(Utah 1994). This is so because "[t]he power to execute sentences remains in the exclusive
control of the judiciary." Padilla v. Utah Board ofPardons, 947 P.2d 664,668 (Utah 1997)
(emphasis added). That said, however, all matters pertaining to sentencing do not reside with
the judiciary. "[T]he power to fix sentencing limits and the power to suspend sentence in
favor of probation are not inherent in the judiciary but must be authorized by statute." State
v. Green, 757 P.2d 462,464 (Utah 1988); accord Padilla, 947 P.2d at 668-69 (holding that
judiciary's power to execute sentences is circumscribed by statutory limitations). As
observed by the United States Supreme Court in reference to federal sentencing, "the
function of determining the scope and extent of punishment [ ] never has been thought to be
assigned by the Constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction of any one of the three Branches
of Government." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364, 109 S.Ct. 647, 650-51
(1989). Thus, the legislature may fix virtually any punishment "and leave no discretion
whatever in the courts as to the extent or degree of punishment." State v. Bishop, 1X1 P.2d
261, 264 (Utah 1986) (quoting Mutart v. Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 250, 170 P. 67, 68 (1917)).
Traditionally, the prosecutor plays a substantial role in deciding a defendant's
exposure in sentencing. "For example, the prosecutor determines the extent of a suspect's
sentencing exposure by deciding whether to file charges, what charges to file, whether to
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request the dismissal of charges, [ ] whether to charge prior convictions for purposes of
determining a defendant's habitual criminality," and whether to plea bargain. People v.
R. W. V., 942 P.2d 1317,1320 (Colo. App. 1997); accord Pierce, 163 Vt. at 196, 657 A.2d at
195.
As noted above, section 76-3-402 allows the trial court to "enter a judgment of
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1).

Section 76-3-402 also permits a double-reduction if the

prosecutor agrees. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(3). Section 76-3-402 thus broadens the
discretion of the trial court at sentencing. In conditioning a double-reduction on the assent
of the prosecutor, the statute does not sanction an impermissible intrusion into the Judiciary
by the Executive. The prosecutor does not impose sentence. That role remains with the
court, which is not required to accept the recommendation of the prosecutor. Indeed, before
a court grants a double-reduction, it still must conclude that the normal sentence would be
"unduly harsh" after considering "the nature and circumstances of the offense" and the
"history and character of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1). Thus, while the
statute takes away some of the prosecutor's ability to determine a defendant's sentencing
exposure, it preserves that role as to any double-reduction in conviction and sentencing.
Accordingly, no separation of powers violation is present.
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C.

SHOULD THIS COURT FIND THAT THE DOUBLE-REDUCTION REQUIREMENT
VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS PRINCIPLE, IT SHOULD B E SEVERED.

Even if this Court were to find that the double-reduction requirement violated the
separation of powers principle under the Utah Constitution, the trial court would have no
authority to reduce a conviction by two degrees. "The general rule is 'that statutes, where
possible, are to be construed so as to sustain their constitutionality. Accordingly, if a portion
of the statute might be saved by severing the part that is unconstitutional, such should be
done.'" State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, f 18,980 P.2d 191 (quoting Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah
Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293,1299 (Utah 1982)). A review of the statute reveals
that even if paragraph (3) of the statute is found to be unconstitutional, the remainder of the
statute should be saved by severing paragraph (3). However, paragraph (3) itself could not
be severed in piecemeal fashion to allow a double reduction without the prosecutor's consent.
The Utah Supreme Court has observed that in determining whether an unconstitutional
subsection is severable, the appellate courts look to legislative intent. Id. at f 19. "If the
intent is not expressly stated, [the courts] then turn to the statute itself, and examine the
remaining constitutional portion of the statute in relation to the stricken portion. If the
remainder of the statute is operable and still furthers the intended legislative purpose, the
statute will be allowed to stand." Id. The Court thus engages in a two-part inquiry. First,
the court must determine if the remaining provisions of the statute are constitutional standing
alone. Second, the Court must determine if the remaining provisions still further the
legislative purpose of the statute. The second inquiry focuses on "whether the legislature
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would have passed the statute without the objectionable part, and whether or not the parts are
so dependent upon each other that the court should conclude the intention was that the statute
be effective only in its entirety." Stewart v. Utah Public Service Comm fn, 885 P.2d 759,779
(Utah 1994).
Although the legislative intent is not expressed in section 76-3-402, an examination
of the statute itself reveals that it remains "operable and still furthers the intended legislative
purpose." Id. If paragraph (3) providing for a double reduction is severed, the statute
authorizes trial courts to "enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense
and impose sentence accordingly." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1). As noted above, the law
is well settled that the legislature may define the offense and fix the punishment. Indeed, the
legislature may choose to "leave no discretion whatever in the courts as to the extent or
degree of punishment." Bishop, 717 P.2d at 264 (quoting Mutart, 51 Utahat250,170P.at
68). Thus, after severing paragraph (3), it is clear that the remainder of the statute, which
simply broadens the authority of the trial court's in entering a conviction and executing a
sentence, remains operable. Moreover, the statute as severed "still furthers [its] intended
legislative purpose"—giving the trial courts greater latitude to impose a more lenient
punishment when the circumstances so justify.
That said, however, paragraph (3) may not be severed in piecemeal fashion to allow
a double reduction in sentencing without the prosecutor's consent. Although the legislature
could assuredly do so constitutionally, a fair reading of the statute makes it clear that the
legislature believed that a double reduction would only be justified if the prosecutor—who
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is charged with the enforcement of the law—agreed to such a reduction. In other words, the
legislature would not have given trial courts the authority to grant a double reduction based
on their own review of the circumstances. Accordingly, if this Court were to find that
paragraph (3) is unconstitutional, the trial court would only be left with the authority to
reduce a conviction by one degree, not two.8
III.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTIONS
In his next claim on appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of securities fraud and money laundering. Aplt. Brf. at 24-33. This claim fails.
This Court's review of the evidence is limited. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,233
(Utah 1992). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Id. Defendant,

In that event, because defendant actually received a double reduction in the degree
of his securities fraud conviction, this Court would be required to remand to the trial
court. Although the securities fraud statute for which defendant was convicted was not
divided into a third and second degree felony, it was in fact divided into two different and
separate degrees (roughly analogous to a third and second degree felony). Where the
value of the property sought to be obtained was $10,000 or less, a violation of the statute
was punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 and imprisonment of not more than
five years. Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-21(2)(a) (1993). If it was more than $10,000, a
violation was punishable by a fine of not more than $20,000 and imprisonment of not
more than ten years. Utah Code Ann. §61-1-21 (2)(b) (1993). Defendant was tried and
convicted for the higher degree of securities fraud. See R. 406. Accordingly, a single
reduction would have resulted in the entering of a conviction for the securities fraud
violation punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 and imprisonment of not more than five
years. The trial court's entry of a conviction for a class A misdemeanor thus constituted a
double reduction in the offense. Accordingly, defendant is in no case entitled to a further
reduction in sentencing and may have received a greater reduction than the law permits if
the provision is deemed unconstitutional.
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therefore, bears a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Shepherd,
1999 UT App 305, atf 25. He must first "'marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and
then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict."' State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 14, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v.
Fire Ins, Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991)); accord Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305,
atf 25.
The Court affords great deference to the jury verdict and will not reverse a conviction
unless "the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable [people] could not
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,
231 (Utah 1980). In other words, defendant must overcome the formidable burden of
showing that the evidence "'was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to
make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.'" State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, % 19, 999
P.2d 565 (quoting Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998)).
A.

SECURITIES FRAUD:
REQUIREMENT.

DEFENDANT

FAILS

TO

MEET

THE

MARSHALING

In claiming that the State's evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
securities fraud, defendant challenges only the evidence establishing that he committed the
crime willfully. See Aplt. Brf. at 25-27. He argues, in essence, that the evidence was
insufficient to show that he was a knowing and willing participant in the securities
transaction. See Aplt. Brf. at 25-27. As noted, defendant must first marshal all the evidence
in support of the verdict. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, ^ 14. The appellate court will not entertain
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the merits of an insufficiency claim if a defendant fails to meet the marshaling requirement.
See State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604,607-08 (Utah App. 1994). Instead, the Court will assume
the evidence supported the verdict. See Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, f 30, 979 P.2d 338.
Defendant fails to meet his threshold burden of marshaling the evidence.
Defendant only acknowledges evidence that defendant knew his client and believed
him to be credible. Aplt. Brf. at 25. He acknowledges no other evidence establishing that
his conduct was willful. He does not acknowledge in his argument that he called his friend
Lance Hatch about the investment opportunity and faxed him the investment contract form.
See R. 488: 214-18, 223, 236. He ignores the evidence that he solicited Hatch's help in
finding investors. See R. 488: 217, 220, 223; R. 489: 115. He ignores the testimony that
when Hatch balked at the idea of approaching his friends about the investment, defendant
told him the investment was "okay." R. 488: 218-20. He also fails to acknowledge that he
reviewed the terms of the contract on the telephone with both Hatch and Mr. Sorenson. See
R. 488: 228-29. He ignores the testimony that he told Hatch that it was a good deal. See R.
489: 5, 106; R. 488: 223-24. He also ignores evidence that he told Hatch that an urgency
existed to obtain the investment—that "there was only about a week to get it all done." R.
488: 226-27. Finally, he ignores evidence that he told Hatch and Sorenson that he and Smith
had been together for some time. R. 489: 55-56. The foregoing evidence was more than
sufficient to support a finding that defendant willfully participated in the securities
transaction—he initiated the search for investors, he was aware of the terms of the
investment, he gave his opinion that it was viable and "okay," and he repeatedly assured both
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Hatch and Sorenson that Smith could be trusted. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1358
(Utah 1993) (holding that State need only prove that defendant "acted 'willfully' in
misstating or omitting material facts" and that proof of "scienter" is not required).
Notwithstanding that evidence, defendant fails to acknowledge it. He does not
"present, in comprehensive and fastidious order," the evidence at trial which supports the
verdict. See West Valley City v. Majestic In v. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991).
Instead, he only provides a scintilla of evidence showing willfulness and questions the
materiality of his omissions, the testimony regarding the fraudulent nature of "prime bank
instruments," and the alleged misstatements by the prosecutor—matters that do not go to his
wilfulness.
In short, defendant has made almost no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting
the verdict. Counsel has not, as required, "extricate[d] himself... from the client's shoes
and fully assumefd] the adversary's position," presenting "every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial" which supports the jury verdict. See Majestic, 818 P.2d at 1315. Only
after doing so can defendant demonstrate the "fatal flaw" in the evidence. Id. Because
defendant has not met the marshaling requirement, this Court must assume the evidence
supported the verdict and should decline to consider the merits of defendant's claim. See
Young, 1999 UT 3 8 4 30.
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B.

MONEY

LAUNDERING:

DEFENDANT

FAILS TO M E E T THE

MARSHALING

REQUIREMENT.

Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the money
laundering conviction. See Aplt. Brf. at 28-33. However, just as his challenge to the
securities fraud conviction does not meet the marshaling requirement, so too does his
challenge to the money laundering conviction fall short of the marshaling requirement.
In his challenge to the money laundering conviction, defendant disputes the
sufficiency of the evidence showing that he knew illegal investment proceeds were being
funneled through his bank account. See Aplt. Brf. at 28-29. Defendant asserts that he was
largely unaware of the transfer of funds through his account and that he had no reason to
know the transaction was illegal. However, he wholly fails to marshal the evidence
supporting the State's case. Instead, he simply argues that he was "forced into a surety
situation without his knowledge, or consent, by the victim himself." Aplt. Brf. at 29.
In the first instance, defer dant ignores the reasonable inference that Hatch received
defendant's bank account coordinates for the transfer from defendant himself. As discussed
above, the evidence showed that the two were working together to find investors. It is thus
reasonable to infer that defendant gave Hatch the necessary coordinates to facilitate the
transaction. Moreover, defendant wholly ignores Hatch's testimony that when the transfer
was arranged, defendant told him "that this whole thing had better be good because he didn't
have enough malpractice insurance to cover the problem." R. 488: 245. In other words,
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defendant was well aware of his role in the transaction and was well aware that his
participation to facilitate the transaction would subject him to liability.
Because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of defendant's
conviction for money laundering, and in light of the substantial evidence demonstrating
defendant's knowing participation, this Court should decline to consider the merits of
defendant's claim. See Young, 1999 UT 38, f 30.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL
Defendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's question of Mr. Sorenson as to whether defendant had
told him that he had been convicted of a felony. Aplt. Brf. at 33-34.9

9

Defendant also baldly asserts that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial
misconduct by arguing in closing that defendant's injunction, previous conviction, and
prison sentence demonstrated that he was a bad person. Aplt. Brf. at 34. Defendant,
however, does not discuss the language used by the prosecutor, explain why the argument
was improper, or explain how it resulted in prejudice. See Aplt. Brf. at 34-39. This Court
should not therefore address the issue. See Bryant, 965 P.2d at 549. Moreover, defendant
did not object to the alleged improper argument. See R. 495: 48-49. "Because defense
counsel did not object to the comments when they occurred, defendant must show plain
error on appeal." State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 292 (Utah App.) (citing Dunn, 850
P.2d at 1208), cert denied, 982 P.2d 87 (Utah 1998). Where he has failed to even
attempt to show why the remarks were improper, he cannot prevail under a plain error
analysis. A review of the remarks nevertheless reveals that they were not improper.
Moreover, the trial court fully instructed the jury on the limited purpose for considering
the conviction and injunction. See R. 437-39. Defendant also did not explain how he was
prejudiced by the prosecutor's alleged improper remarks regarding a prison sentence.
The court should therefore also decline to address that issue.
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"Because a trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's impact on
the proceedings, [this Court] will not reverse a trial court's denial of a mistrial motion based
on prosecutorial misconduct absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262,
276 (Utah 1996); accord State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, f 18, 8 P.3d 1025. In reviewing a claim
of prosecutorial misconduct, the Court "must determine if the prosecutor's remarks calls to
the attention of the jurors matters they would not be justified in considering in reaching the
verdict and, if so, whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the misconduct so prejudiced
the jury that there would have been a more favorable result absent the misconduct." State
v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988). To meet the prejudice prong of the inquiry, "the
error [must be] substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in
its absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." Harmon, 956
P.2d at 276. (internal quotes and citations omitted). In other words, "[u]nless a review of the
record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely
influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, [the Court] will
not find that the [trial] court's decision was an abuse of discretion." State v. Robertson, 932
P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997); accord Harmon, 956 P.2d at 276.
In this case, it cannot be said that the prosecutor's question so prejudiced defendant
that he was denied a fair trial. It is undisputed that the prosecutor asked Mr. Sorenson
whether defendant indicated that "he had ever been convicted of a felony." See R. 489: 98.
It is also undisputed that no evidence was ever introduced that defendant was convicted of
a felony. However, the prosecutor never attempted to make a felony conviction the focus of
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the case and thus his inadvertent reference to a felony conviction could not have affected the
outcome of the trial.
The State introduced evidence that defendant had been convicted of a criminal
contempt charge involving a securities violation and that he was subject to a permanent
injunction restricting participation in securities transactions. See R. 488:189-90; SE6 & SE7
(Addendum G). This evidence was used to establish that defendant failed to disclose
material facts. The State's expert witness testified that such information was important to
the average investor in making a decision to invest. R.488: 285-86,293-96. In other words,
it was the State's theory at trial that defendant's failure to disclose this information to Mr.
Sorenson constituted a material omission—an element necessary to prove the State's case.
See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). The focus of the information was not that defendant was
convicted of a felony or even of a crime, but that he failed to disclose information that was
important to the average investor. In short, the prosecutor never focused on the fact of a
felony—the remark was inadvertent and inconsequential in light of the State's overall case.
Moreover, defendant promptly objected to the characterization of the conviction, and
after a short side bar, defense counsel stated before the jury "that the question assumed facts
not in evidence" and that there was "no evidence" of such a conviction. R. 489: 99-100. The
trial court stated that that was "correct" and that "[tjhere is no evidence whether there was
anything to disclose at this point." R. 489: 100. The prosecutor then asked whether
defendant had uindicate[d] whether he had ever been convicted of a crime of any kind," to
which Sorenson replied that defendant had not. R. 489: 100. This exchange made it clear
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to the jury that there was no evidence of a felony conviction. Moreover, as explained, the
relevance of this information came to light later in the trial. The true character and
importance of the conviction was revealed to the jury when the judgment was admitted into
evidence and when the State's expert testified as to the importance of the information to an
average investor. In short, nothing was made of the felony.
Because the focus of the State's case was never on the fact of a "felony" conviction,
but rather on defendant's failure to disclose material information, it cannot be said that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial. See Harmon,
956 P.2d at 276.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE
REQUIREMENT OF A UNANIMOUS VERDICT
Defendant next contends that it was error for the trial court to give Instruction No.
13G. Aplt. Brf. at 40. He argues that the instruction violated the principal ofjury unanimity
and thus requires reversal of his conviction. Aplt. Brf. at 43.
Instruction No. 13G provided:
You are instructed that while a number of representations and omissions
are alleged as the basis for the charge of securities fraud, it is not incumbent
upon the state to prove each and every one of them. It is enough that the state
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a false statement or material omission
was made in connection with the offer or sale of the security.
R. 449 (Addendum J). Because defendant did not object to this instruction before it was read
to the jury, this Court will not address it on appeal absent plain error. See Utah R. Crim. P.
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19(c); State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (holding that the "manifest
injustice" exception under rule 19 is the same as the plain error exception); see also State v.
Tenney, 913 P.2d 750,759 (Utah App.), cert denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996).10 To show
plain error, defendant must demonstrate that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable outcome for the appellant." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah
1993); accord Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109. To show a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome, defendant must demonstrate that the error was "of sufficient magnitude
that it affects the substantial rights of a party." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109. Defendant has
failed to argue that plain error justifies review of the issue and this Court should therefore
decline to consider it on appeal. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995)
(refusing to consider an unpreserved issue where defendant had not argued plain error on
appeal).
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's claim under a plain error analysis,
defendant fails to meet his burden. Distilled to its essence, defendant's argument is that the
trial court should have instructed the jury that it must reach a unanimous decision that

10

Defendant challenged the instruction a month after the guilty verdict was
returned in amended motions for a new trial and for arrest of judgment. R. 541, 552. His
claim that Instruction No. 13G was improper was one of a laundry list of items upon
which defendant relied on. See R. 541, 552 (alleging that "Jury Instruction No. 13G did
not provide for jury uninimity [sic] on an element of the crime of securities fraud and thus
invited the jury to commit error"). R. 541, 552. The trial court, however, does not appear
to have decided the issue on the merits, noting that many of defendant's claims should
have been raised at trial. See R. 559.
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defendant omitted a particular, material fact or that he made a particular, material
misrepresentation. Regardless of whether the law requires such unanimity, the instructions
when read together can be fairly read to so provide. See State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391,396
(Utah App. 1994) (holding that "[j]liry instructions must be read and evaluated as a whole").
Instruction No. 13A instructed the jury on the elements of securities fraud as follows:
Before you can find the defendant guilty of the crime of Securities Fraud
as charged in Count I of the Second Amended Information, you must find
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements
of the crime:
1. That defendant Lee E Walker,
2. Acting willfully,
3. On or about October 18, 1994 (although the exact date is
immaterial),
4. In connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a security,
5. Directly or indirectly did either of the following:
(a) Made any untrue statement of a material fact,
Or
(b) Omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading.
If you find that the evidence establishes each of these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty. If you find
that the evidence fails to establish one or more of these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty.
R. 443 (Addendum J). Lest the jury misinterpreted this instruction, the court advised the jury
in Instruction 13G "that while a number of representations and omissions are alleged as a
basis for the charge of securities fraud, it is not incumbent upon the state to prove each and
every one of them." R. 449. This is a correct statement of the law—section 61-1-1 only
requires the State to prove a single misrepresentation or omission. See Utah Code Ann. § 611-1(2). The instruction further advised the jury that "[i]t is enough that the state prove
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beyond a reasonable doubt that a false statement or material omission was made in
connection with the offer or sale of the security." R. 449. This instruction can thus be fairly
read to require that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either a false
statement or a material omission. A subsequent instruction, No. 15, then instructed the jury
that its "verdict must be unanimous" and "represent the careful and conscientious judgment
of each of and all of you." R. 455 (Addendum J).
When these instructions are viewed as a whole, they can fairly be read to require that
the jurors must all agree on the precise manner by which defendant violated the securities
fraud statute. Therefore, Instruction No. 13G was not like the instruction in State v.
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 58, 992 P.2d 951, wherein the jury was expressly instructed that
"[t]here is no requirement that the jurors be unanimous about precisely which act occurred
or when or where the act or acts occurred." The trial court here never gave such an
instruction. To the contrary, it instructed the jury that its "verdict must be unanimous." R.
455. The instructions given here were thus even more explicit on the requirement of jury
unanimity than were those upheld in State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, 20 P.3d 888, which
appeared to only include an elements instruction. Evans, 2001 UT 22, at f 15 & n.l. The
court concluded that because the instruction did not "rise to the level of the 'non-unanimity'
instruction at issue in Saunders,." there was no plain error. Id. at f 17 (footnotes omitted).
Because the jurors were specifically instructed that their verdict must be unanimous,
see R. 455, defendant has failed to demonstrate any error, much less plain error and this
Court should therefore reject his claim.
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Moreover, any possible confusion in the instructions does not create a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome. As discussed above, there was substantial evidence
of both misrepresentations and material omissions. Defendant represented on multiple
occasions that the investment was "okay" and that his client could be trusted notwithstanding
the fact that "there [is] no such thing" as prime bank instruments and "any use of them [is]
illegitimate and fraudulent." See R. 488: 217-220, 223-26, 229; R. 489: 55-56, 113-15; R.
490: 468,477-78; see also R. 489: 49, 51-52, 60, 106. There was also ample evidence that
defendant never disclosed to Mr. Sorenson that he was subject to a permanent injunction
involving securities transactions and that he had been sentenced to prison for a criminal
contempt conviction relating to a securities violation—information that would be important
to the average investor. See R. 489: 98-100; R. 488: 233, 285-86, 293-96. Indeed, these
facts were never really contested by defendant. Thus any alleged error would be harmless
in any event.11
11

Moreover, contrary to defendant's argument on appeal, the jury need not all agree
on the manner by which the crime is committed. Article I, section 10 provides that "[i]n
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous." See Utah Const, art. I, § 10. A majority
of the Utah Supreme Court has apparently interpreted that provision to require that
"'unanimity [is] necessary as to all elements of an offense.'" Evans, 2001 UT 22, at f 17
(quoting Saunders, 1999 UT 59, at f 61). However, the jury is not required to be
unanimous as to the manner by which an element is committed, as defendant argues.
In State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987), a plurality of the Utah Supreme
Court, adopted the Sullivan rule, named after the New York decision in People v.
Sullivan, 65 N.E. 989 (N.Y. App. 1903). Under the Sullivan rule, "a defendant is not
entitled to a unanimous verdict on the precise manner in which the crime was committed,
or by which of several alternative methods or modes, or under which interpretation of the
evidence so long as there is substantial evidence to support each of the methods, modes,
or manners charged." Russell, 733 P.2d at 165. Nevertheless, the Sullivan rule has its
limitations. "If the statute under which the defendant is convicted actually defines more
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VI.
THE MANNER BY WHICH THE TRIAL COURT SELECTED THE
ALTERNATE JUROR DID NOT PREJUDICE DEFENDANT
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it
designated as the alternate juror Juror 6—who stood third in order, rather than Juror
26—who stood ninth in order. Aplt. Brf. at 43-46.
Following the jury voir dire, the parties exercised three peremptory challenges each,
leaving a panel of nine jurors in the following order: Juror 2 (Thomas E. Stokes), Juror 5
(Jule W. Kreyling), Juror 6 (Jerry Tischner), Juror 8 (Angenette L. Pickette), Juror 9 (Marie
C. Hansen), Juror 11 (Kelley J. Blake), Juror 13 (Marietta W. Beatty), Juror 20 (Phyllis F.
Petersen), and Juror 26 (Sharam L. Isam). See R. 424 (Addendum K). Defense counsel

than one crime and not merely one crime which may be committed in several different
ways, the defendant is entitled to jury unanimity on which crime he is guilty of
committing." Id. at 166-67.
Applying the Sullivan rule to the case here, the jury was not required to all agree
on the precise manner by which defendant committed the securities fraud. As observed
by the courts in Pennsylvania, "6[t]he essence of fraud is deceit intentionally and
successfully practiced to induce another to part with property or with some legal rights.'"
In re Estate ofDoerr, 565 A.2d 1207, 1211 (Pa. Super. 1987) (quoting In re Thome's
Estate, 25 A.2d 811, 816 (Pa. 1942)). Thus, "fraud comprises 'anything calculated to
deceive, whether by single act or combination, or by suppression of truth, or suggestion of
what is false, whether by direct falsehood or innuendo, by speech or silence, word of
mouth, or look or gesture . . . . " Id. (internal quotes omitted). Under section 61-1-1, so
long as the jury unanimously agrees that defendant committed a deceptive act—whether
by misrepresenting a material fact or failing to disclose a material fact—the unanimity
requirement is satisfied. Moreover, it is clear that the statute defines one crime, not two,
and that under the circumstances here, only one crime was committed. As explained in
Russell, "'[t]o require unanimity as to the manner of participation would be to frustrate
the justice system, promote endless jury deliberations, encourage hung juries, and
precipitate retrials in an effort to find agreement on a nonessential issue.'" Id. at 167-68
(quoting Holland v. State, 280 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Wis. 1979)).
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asked the court, in the presence of the jurors, whether Juror 26 would serve as an alternate.
R. 489: 24. The trial court indicated that it had not yet decided. R. 489: 24. At the
conclusion of closing arguments, the trial court designated Juror 6 as the alternate juror. R.
490: 567-68. Defendant voiced an objection, but did not state the reason for the objection.
R. 490: 568.
On appeal, defendant argues that pursuant to rules 17 and 18, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Juror 26 should have been treated as the alternate juror because he was ninth in
order of the nine prospective jurors who survived for-cause and peremptory challenges. Aplt.
Brf. at 44-45. Defendant's final claim lacks merit because he has not alleged or shown any
real prejudice.
The law is well settled that Utah's appellate courts will "not interfere with a jury
verdict because of error or irregularity unless upon review of the entire record it is
determined that prejudice has occurred in a substantial manner." State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d
1338,1352 (Utah 1977). To show prejudice in the selection of the jury, the defendant must
"show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,
398 (Utah 1994), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1115,115 S.Ct. 910 (1995). Although Utah courts
have most frequently required this showing in cases involving a trial court's failure to
remove a partial juror, that same showing is required in cases involving the improvident
removal of a juror. Thus, "it is not reversible error to exclude a juror for an insufficient
cause if an impartial and unobjectionable jury is afterward obtained." State v. Seyboldt, 65
Utah 204, 236 P.2d 225, 228 (Utah 1925) (internal quotes omitted).
43

Defendant has not alleged on appeal that anyone serving on the jury was partial or
otherwise unqualified. See Aplt. Brf. at 43-46. Nor did he so allege below, but passed the
jury for cause. See R. 489: 13, 15. Defendant does not even allege that the trial court
harbored an improper motive in "disqualifying" Juror 6. See Aplt. Brf. at 45. Defendant
simply contends that the manner by which the court selected the alternate juror created "a
significant potential for abuse." Aplt. Brf. at 45. As discussed, defendant must show actual
prejudice. See Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1352. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred in its
selection of Juror 6 as the alternate juror, that error is harmless and does not support reversal.
See Myers v. State, 565 So.2d 554,557 (Miss. 1990) (holding that even though the trial court
did not follow the proper procedure for excusing and replacing a juror, defendant was not
entitled to reversal because he did not demonstrate prejudice); State v. Griffin, 866 P.2d
1156, 1163 (N.M. 1993) (refusing to address defendant's claim of error in the trial court's
replacement of a juror where he did not allege that the alternate juror was unfair or that the
jury that decided the case was unfair); State v. Kaul, 457 N.W.2d 252,254-55 (Minn. 1990)
(refusing to reverse a conviction even though the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor
to exercise a peremptory strike after the trial was completed because defendant previously
approved the alternate juror).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in point I of the brief, the State respectfully requests the Court
to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Should this Court find jurisdiction, the State
requests the Court to affirm defendant's convictions.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

Utah Const, art L S 10
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital
cases the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the
jury shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury
consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict shall be
unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury
in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Utah Const, art V, § 1
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and
no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1993)
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase
of any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21(2) (1993)
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1 shall upon conviction
be:
(a) fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or
both if, at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or less;
(b) fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years or
both if, at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth more than $10,000.

Utah Code Ann, 8 76-3-402 (1995)
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the
offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and
character of the defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the
conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute and to
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the
court may unless otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence
accordingly.
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered
to be for a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor and
the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class A
misdemeanor; or
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed
on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of probation or not;
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his
probation; and
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, and a
hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the interest of
justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A misdemeanor.
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless
the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the
offense may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced
under this section by more than two degrees.
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from
obtaining or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law.
Utah Code Ann, § 76-10-1903 (1990)
(1) A person commits the offense of money laundering by financial
transaction if, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, he conducts or attempts
to conduct a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity:
(a) with intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
(b) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to:
(i) conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) avoid a transaction reporting requirement under this chapter.
(2) Money laundering by financial transaction is a second degree felony.

Addendum B

Eric A. Ludlow, #5104
Washington County Attorney
Brock HBelnap #6179
Deputy Washington County Attorney
178 North 200 East
St. George, UT 84770
(435) 634-5723

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff;

JUDGMENT, STAY OF
IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE,
AND ORDER OF PROBATION

vs.
LEE E. WALKER,
Defendant.

Criminal No. 961500684
Judge G. Rand Beacham

The above-entitled matter came before the Court for sentencing on the 21* day of
January, 1999. The State of Utah was represented by David E. Wayment, Utah Division of
Securities and Brock R. Belnap, Deputy Washington County Attorney. The Defendant, LEE E.
WALKER, was present and represented by Jim Scarth. The Defendant had previously been
found guilty at jury trial of COUNT I: SECURITIES FRAUD, a felony punishable by a fine of
not more than $20,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years, and COUNT U:
MONEY LAUNDERING, a second degree felony. After considering the recommendations of
counsel for both parties, after having received and read a pre-sentence investigation report from

the Department of Corrections, and after having reviewed the files and records herein and being
fully advised in the premises, the Court now makes and enters the following Judgment, Stay of
Imposition of Sentence and Order of Probation:
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY FOUND, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, LEE E.
WALKER, is guilty of the offenses of COUNT I: SECURITIES FRAUD, a felony punishable by
a fine of not more than $20,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years and COUNT II:
MONEY LAUNDERING, a second degree felony.
STAY OF IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the imposition of any
sentence in this matter is stayed.
ORDER OF PROBATION
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said Defendant, LEE
E. WALKER, is hereby placed on supervised probation for a period of thirty-six (36) months,
strictly within the following terms, provisions and conditions:
1.

That the Defendant be liable for One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) in

restitution to Marc Sorenson jointly and severally with any other defendant convicted of a crime
in connection with thefraudulentactivities resulting in the loss of Marc Sorenson's money;
provided that, the Defendant shall not be required to pay any money toward restitution until after
any trial and sentencing of any convicted codefendants;
2.

That the Defendant cooperate fully with Adult Probation and Parole;

3.

That the Defendant have no business activities involving the sale of securities and

that the Defendant not participate in any manner in any transaction involving the offer or sale of
securities to any third person; and
4.

The Defendant have no law violations.

This Court specifically retains jurisdiction over the above cause and over the person of
said LEE E. WALKER, for the purpose of making such Orders and Judgments or Commitments
as the same may become necessary or proper.
DATED this a**

day of January, 1999.

^XV^(^*^^

G.RANDBEACHAM
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
)

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

I, Linda Williamson, Clerk of said District Court of Washington County, State of Utah,
do hereby certify that the Honorable G. Rand Beacham, whose name is subscribed to the
preceding certificate, is the Judge of said Court, duly commissioned and qualified, and that the
signature of said Judge to said certificate is genuine.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the Court
this

O

day of fanowy, 1999.

LINDA WILLIAMSON, Clerk of District Court

By

&L
Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I do hereby certify that on thiso?? ~ day of January, 1999,1 placed an unexecuted copy
of the above and foregoing Judgment, Stay of Imposition of Sentence, and Order of Probation in
the inter-office folder of Jim Scarth, Attorney for Defendant.

^L
MARYANN CHARTER, Legal Secretary

Addendum C

FILED
AUG \ 9 1999
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT Of APPEALS
00O00

State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 990198-CA
F I L E D
(August 1 9 , 1999)

Lee Walker,
Defendant and Appellant.

1999 UT App 241

Fifth District, St. George Department
The Honorable G. Rand Beacham
Attorneys:

Jim R. Scarth, St. George, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Christine Soltis, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Wilkins, Billings, and Jackson.
PER CURIAM:
that we stay this appeal and remand the matter
may rule on his motions to arrest judgment and
so tefee trial coi;
State does not object. However, we are
for new trial,
without authoi&ty
do so.
%
In the Fehrua: 3, 1999, judgment from which Walker seeks to
rt stayed imposition of sentence. Until a
appeal, the tqtal
entenced, there is no final, appealable
d ^ e n d a n t hafiT ^"
P.2d 415, 416 (Utah Ct. App.
or|er. S££ $ W $ ; . Hunsaker, 933
(stating that ,f [b] ecause defendant has not
199"
(per curie
order, and
been
the appeal was not taken from a final
11
jurisdiction
to
consider
the
appeal
);
State v.
this cour Lacks
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978) (stating that the sentence
is the final judgment from which an appeal can be taken).
Because Walker has not been sentenced, there is no final,
appealable order, and we lack jurisdiction to consider his
appeal.
Moreover, because no sentence has been announced Utah R.
App. P. 4 ( c ) , which states that "a notice of appeal filed after
the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before the
entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be

treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof," does
not apply. To the contrary, the trial court specifically stayed
the announcement of sentence.
Accordingly, we have no alternative but to dismiss Walker's
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This dismissal is without
prejudice to the filing of a new, timely notice of appeal after
the trial court enters a final, appealable order.

Micfcaef I f f ^ i

Presiding Judge

T^sT*****

Addendum D

FILED
MAY 1 8 2000
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20000131-CA
FILED
(May 18, 2000)

Lee Walker,
Defendant and Appellant.

2000 UT App 148

Fifth District, St. George Department
The Honorable G. Rand Beacham
Attorneys: Harold J. Dent Jr., St, George, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Laura B, Dupaix, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before i^S^ges Bench, Davis, and Orme.
*» v

PER CU$&M:

?

•SsA

Tais matlW^La he£ ire the court on its own motion for
thfipgroua^ that the notice of appeal was
ismiss theoappeal.
not timely ^fil^di >1

:<S

A* n b t ^ ^ ^ ^ p e a i ^ s h a l l " be" filed with the clerk of the
trial court witnrrx tljirt^>43ay£c off4sentry of the order appealed
from. See* Utah RT^App^R. 4 0a$3 ***tJnder this rule, the latest
possible date orr whjch appellant could have filed his notice of
appeal from the Jai&uary 14* 2000, order was February 14, 2000.
The notice of appear was not filed until February 15th, and,
therefore^—is-untimely. ~ This court lacks jurisdiction over an
untimely appear, - an<i,~ Accordingly, must dismiss the appeal. See
Glezog"VT~PionLieT—Inrrr , 896 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Utah Ct. App.
1995)7
i;JU
Appellant asserts that the notice of appeal is timely with
respect to the amended order entered March 1, 2000, which order,
he argues, replaced the January 14th order. The amended order
does not enlarge the time for appeal, however, because it does
not change the substance or character of the original order.

"[W]here a belated entry merely constitutes
an amendment or modification not changing the
substance or character of the judgment, such
entry is merely a nunc pro tunc entry which
relates back to the time the original
judgment was entered, and does not enlarge
the time for appeal; but where the
modification or amendment is in some material
matter, the time begins to run from the time
of the modification or amendment-"
Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(citation omitted). In Nielson, the amended order clarifying
that the prevailing party was entitled to costs in addition to
the attorney fees already awarded was deemed of insufficient
importance to change the character of the judgment, and did not
create a new judgment for purposes of determining the timeliness
of the appeal. See id. at 133. Similarly, the March 1st order,
which merely adds an identification of the parties and their
attorneys, does not affect the substantive rights of the parties
or change the character of the judgment. Accordingly, it does
not create a new judgment for purposes of determining the
timeliness of the notice of appeal. The time in which appellant
could appeal started to run from the date of
th^mmitainal
judgment, rendering the notice of appeal untimel^E

/ & * # 0. Jg^J.
sy^fr
Russell

Bench, Judge

Jame^'Z'. Davis%' Judge

I, the undersig
Appeals, do here
v ^ ^ full, true and corre
y g ^ % r r 1 1 l e in the>Wta& c
whereof, I ha'
the Court
ha D'Alesandro
Clerk* of Ah^Gourt

mat

Zt$Q
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'00 DEC 11 flF) 3 27
r.

v

/) l\ C J J N T Y

SCARTH & DENT
Harold J. Dent Jr. (0871)
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
150 North 200 East, Suite 203
P.O. Box 160
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 628-2884
FAX: (435) 628-2179

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

])

AMENDED JUDGMENT

;
]

LEE E. WALKER,
Defendant.

;i

Case No. 961500684

]>

Judge G. Rand Beacham

This matter came before the Court on September 7,2000, pursuant to Defendant's
Motion to Enter Conviction pursuant to UCA 76-3-402 and to terminate probation. The
Defendant appeared in person and with counsel Harold J. Dent, Jr. The State was represented by
Brock Belnap, Deputy Washington County Attorney. After considering the arguments of
counsel for both parties, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision dated October 24, 2000.
Pursuant to that Memorandum Decision, the Court hereby enters the following Amended
Judgment:
//

AMENDED JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY FOUND, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, LEE E.
WALKER, is guilty of the offenses of COUNT I: SECURITIES FRAUD, a class A
misdemeanor and COUNT II: MONEY LAUNDERING, a third degree felony.
ORDER OF PROBATION
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that supervised probation
is terminated and that Defendant, LEE E. WALKER, is hereby placed on bench probation for the
balance of the original thirty-six month term under the following conditions:
1.

That the Defendant commit no law violations; and

2.

That the Defendant pay restitution as previously ordered, until the issue of
restitution is resolved.

This Court specifically retains jurisdiction over the above cause and over the person of
said LEE E. WALKER, for the purpose of making such Orders and Judgments or Commitments
as the same may become necessary or proper.
DATED this

D

day of December, 2000.

C\S\^M^)?i)i^
G. RAND BEACHAM
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to form:

Attorney for the State

^.

CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)
) ss.
)

I, Susan N. Scott, Clerk of said District Court of Washington County, State of Utah, do
hereby certify that the Honorable G. Rand Beacham, whose name is subscribed to the preceding
certificate, is the Judge of said Court, duly commissioned and qualified, and that the signature of
said Judge to said certificate is genuine.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the Court
this

//

day of December, 2000.

SUSAN N. SCOTT, Clerk of District Court

By <$JZ.
Deputy Clerk

Addendum F

F!', ED
Utah Cowrt of Appeals

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEC 2 8 20Ct

ooOoo

Panted© Stagg
Cleft of the Court

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER

v.
Case No. 20010012-CA
Lee Walker,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Greenwood, Billing and Davis
This matter comes before the court on Appellee's motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and request for stay of briefing
schedule. Appellee contends that the order from which Appellant
appeals is not a final order. See Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3. This
appeal was originally dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because
the trial courtfs order of February 3, 1999 did not constitute a
final order. However, the trial court subsequently entered an
amended judgment on December 8, 2000 and this appeal followed.
The trial court's order of December 8, 2000 constitutes a final
appealable order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee's motion to dismiss is
denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellee's motion to stay
briefing is denied. Appellee is to file its brief with this
court on or before January 18, 2002.
DATED this 2ft
FOR THE COURT:

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

day of December, 2001.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on February 11, 2002, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:
HAROLD J. DENT, JR
SCARTH & DENT
150 N 200 E #203
PO BOX 160
ST GEORGE UT 84770
JEFFREY S. GRAY
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
Dated this February 11, 2 002.

(U-liiv |Jrt.tiy

BY _
Deputy Clerk

Case No. 20010012-CA

Addendum G

OCT-14-1994

p
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KBMORMDOM OF ONOBMTAMSlTfO
THIS MEMORANDA o? UNDERSTANDING w U n d into thle 14th day e ' October,
1394, by and betveen VALID 2. SUMMA, a resident of 23997 Pranklin Point.
Drive, southfi.id, Michigao 48034, hereinafter referred to ! , c l ! m « !
Dr. Marc Sorenson
hereinafter referred to as th« INVESTOR,
VTHSRSAS, INVESTOR has available unto M a s a i * funds that can bo dlre«t»d
to the account ol CLIENT at Bear Steams and to tho deeignated account of
David B. Suith for tho purpose horain outlined,
and
WHEREAS, CLIENT can direct Baar steams to execute on hia behalf delivery
of Prime Bank Instruments /on a fund-first basis, for sale to buyer* under
exieting contracts, afltf
WHEREAS, CLIENT haa available unto himself a commitment tor tha dellbary
of bank instruments through a World Prime Bank to bring forth their nav
J*«ue Prime Sank instruments for delivery to a eoatomar/buyer or CLZBKT
over a period of sixty (60) banking days.
SOW T U M F O K t , XT IS A 0 1 H TEATs
1.

I N V E S T O R shall arrange for funds to be tent on a bank to bank baaia
to the designated account of Bear Stearns & Company, Inc.. and the
account of David B. Smith* A copy of the vira transfer, signed by
the ban* officer atteetlng to the transfer, shall be transmitted to
CLIENT.

2.

CLIENT shall direct Bear Stearna to utilize the account for delivery
of bank instruments under contract to a customer/buyer of C L I E N T and
to execute the transaction on behalf of CLIENT.

3.

INVESTOR

ahail arrange the transfer of .Qeafwwea>« Thousand Dollars
(t|^=©o«>roc) to tne account of Bear Stearna at Citibank N.T., and

$50^000 to David B. Smith at Palm Beach Natl. Bank & Trust
to the account of Davie B. smith at Palm Beach National Bank pursuant
to the following bank coordinatesi
BANK NAME
BANK ADDRESS
A.B.A. NUMBER
FOR CREDIT TO
ACCOUNT NUMBER
FOR FURTHER CREDIT TO
ACCOUNT NUMBER
TOR FURTHER CREDIT TO
BANK NAME
A.B.A NUMBER
FOR CREDIT TO
ACCOUNT NUMBER

'
t
«
*
»
i
i
»
?
«
»
«

CITIBANK
111 HALL STREET, NEW YORK N.T.
021-000089
BEAR STEARNS * COKPANT, INC.
09233186
HRRCAMTXLB INYBSTMZWT GEOOP, INC.
219-04026-1-4
ACCOUNT NUMBER* RH-310
PALM BEACH NATIONAL BANK « TRUST CO.
067008647
DAVID B. SMITH
110036261

P.02

CCT-14-1994 12:33

KotoiAxoBH or tmunsruxoim
page - 2 4.

Xn consideration of the services rendered by

IMYMTOR

«TTCM

»«»*..

t l M hi* invoetaent *nd «4id amount shall b. di.bjrlid U the ban*
account of INVESTOR under the following tarae and coJditionii
One point tvo five times <1.25) INVESTOR'* investment shall t» «»4«f

One point tvo five tines (1.25) INVESTOR'* investment shall be paid
«««nty <20) b.nlcing days after the Initial payment,
5.

CLIENT agrees to direct Bear Steam* to Ueue a receipt to INVISTO*
for the funds received into their account on behalf of their client.

6.

CLIENT and INVESTOR further agree that an executed facelmlle of thie
docu«*«it shall be considered an original, legally binding In any or
all Jurisdiction*.

?.

The mies and regulations of non-circuarrration/non-dlscioaura pf the
international chamber of Commerce, Paris, rranee, latest edition*,
is Bade part of this Memorandum of Understanding.

8.

In the event of any dispute, the parties herein agres to enter into
Binding arbitration, and any decision rendered by arbitration may be
entered as a judgement in any international court of lav.

WALID Z. SCMHA

INVESTOR

RECEIVED
FEDUNE WIRE TRANSFER WORKSHEET

*p R \ \ 1996
Ospt ot Comnww 3w. of Seturths

FROM: Mountain America Credit Union
Salt lake City, Utah
ABA No. 32407955-6

Pat* JO-IX-^
Amount:

FOR: Member's Name:.

TO:

Time; ?.</S"
<

fOO.am &

Member's Phone No.:

JUL
_£<2£r£Z2£.

Financial institution 3 < ^ » > Jvi^t/t^I^JbL £*>**& a-/.
ABA No.: / , 3 / O / V ^ - / 9

and/or Phone No.

T"

Credit to: ^ * / CthMrt} Qtifant«i
Credit to: •dA.«*.f -&404*.

internal Use Only:
Type:
Password:.

.Fee

L

i2ur

/-7^-3?5-^^

Acct. No. Q2£ACd£Z&
Acct. No.

Attn.:
Attn.:

Cash(GL91110) Fee<GL93442) TV No.:

TO: Mountain America Credit Union
„ hereby eutwrtze Mountain Amencs Cradt Union to
withdraw A^^aa^
plus* M/*fee from my account No.
J/**7*^
(savings, checking^ invostmsnt)swift cash). Please make the funds payable to:

Poet-it" Fax Note
To

/rttifo^ "^miA^o*!

CoJOe**.

Signed:
(Membar/Jcifft Owner)

7671

°*1LJ±S2LJS£--L.

Jif<«w^
°°- ^ a**** rui
From

Ptwe#

pnone*

Fax*

Fax#

(*&-ten

32S-<#33fr
?/-n-^^5

JUH 2 9 1992
OFFiCSCF J1'"•-£_
J . "h i -

.^ ^'-

-,iC-

Jennifer J. Ausenbaugh (Bar No. 3914)
John L. Hunter
Pat Conti
Securities and Exchange Commission
500 Key Bank Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0402
Telephone: (801) 524-5796

*>-

\

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 88-C-619 G

BLAINE C. TAYLOR,
RAY A. WARREN,
LEE A. WALKER,
ELLIOTT R. PEARSON,
SILVER BARON, INC.,
GARY R. LITTLER,
DAVID M. LAMOREAUX,
WARREN & BROWN
ASSOCIATES, INC., and
JAMES A. FOSTER,

FINAL JUDGMENT OF
PERMANENT INJUNCTION
AS TO LEE A.
WALKER

Defendants.

Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission")
having duly commenced this action by filing its Complaint for
Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief (the "Complaint")
and Defendant, Lee A. Walker

("Walker"),

in his Consent and

Undertakings (the "Consent") having entered a general appearance,
having admitted to the jurisdiction of the Court over him and over
the subject matter of this action, having waived the entry of
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and without admitting or
denying the allegations of the Complaint, except as to jurisdiction
to which he admits, having consented to the entry of this Final
Judgment of Permanent Injunction (the "Final Judgment"), and it
further appearing that this Court has jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter hereof, the Court being fully advised in the
premises:
I
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Walker, his
agents, servants, employees, attorneys-in-fact, and those persons
in active concert or participation with them who receive actual
notice of this Order by personal service or otherwise, and each of
them, hereby is permanently enjoined, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails or any facility
of any national securities exchange, from:

2

C.

engaging in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person,

in connection with the purchase or sale of any security in
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
[15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5

[17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5]

thereunder.

There being no just reason for delay, the Clerk of the Court
is hereby directed, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, to enter this Final Judgment forthwith.

JQQM+<
TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED:

%A

June L~ \ 1992
I herebv carafy that the annexed document is a true
and ccrrect copy of the original on file in this office
ATTEST; MARKUS B. ZJMMER

United States District Court
for the
District of Utah
June 30, 1992
* * MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK * *
*:

2:88-cv-00619

rue and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk to the
Dllowing:
David R. King, Esq.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Clark W Sessions, Esq.
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, 13th Floor
201 S Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2215
Robert Meredith, Esq.
124 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Benjamin G. Sprecher, Esq.
3 50 Broadway - 4th Floor
New York, NY 10013
Siegfried Schoedel, Esq.
SEC
450 5th St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20549
John L. Hunter, Esq.
SEC
450 5th St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20549
Jennifer J. Ausenbaugh, Esq.
Securities and Exchange Commission
50 S Main
500 Key Bank Bldg
Salt Lake City, UT 84144-0402

^ w s-j ^ne/ a o 1 jjagnen* m a C r imin a . Case

Fl

Imtefc States fiifitrtcf Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.
LEE WALKER
601 South Stonehill Lane
Salt Lake City, UT 89106

(Name and Address of Defendant)

C0L0HAD0

L E S =

iMTED STATES DISTSICTC*
PENVER. COLC^CO

JA\i£S R. MANSPEAKER

AMENDED

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
Case Number:

87-CR-389-2

David R. King and Thomas Bovle
Attorney for Defendant

THE DEFENDANT ENTERED A PLEA OF:
[ZX guilty Z nolo contendere] as to ggMH^s) the Criminal Contempt Charge
• not guilty as to count(s)

and

THERE WAS^A:
[Z3c finding j verdict] of guilty as to gaocRt^s) rhe Criminal Contempt Charge
THERE WAS^A:
[ C finding L_, verdict] of not guilty as to count(s).
• judgment of acquittal as to count(s).
The defendant is acquitted and discharged as to this/these count(s).
THE DEFENDANT IS CONVICTED OF THE OFFENSE(S) OF:
of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3).

criminal contempt of court in violation

T IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT THAT: the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the
Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative for a term of six months.
It is further ordered that the defendant may voluntarily surrender to the designated
institution by May 30, 1988.

•^NALON^JSyllSSrCf

wSBffiffiitf*™ 005003

CONDITIONS OF PROBATION'
W h e r e probation has been ordered the defendant sha I
rpfram f rom violation of any law (federal state and local) and get in touch immediately with your probation officer f ar^es'ed or
questioned by a law enforcement officer
(2) associate only with law abiding persons and maintain reasonable hours
(3) */ork rpgularly at a lawful occupation and suoport your legal dependents if any to the best of /our ability (When out c f vo k -^o* fy
/our probation officer at once and consult him prior to job changes)
(4) not lea^e the judicial district without permission of the probation officer
(5» ~oti'y your probation officer immediately of any changes in your place of residence
(6) follow the probation officer s instructions and report as d rected
The court may change the conditions of probation 'educe or expend the period of probation and at any time during the orobation po»* od
or within the maximum probation period of 5 years permitted by law may issue a warrant and revoke probation for a violation occurr no,
during the probation period
n

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall pay a total special assessment of $
pursuant to Title 18, U S C Section 3013 f o r c o u n t ( s ) _

as follows

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT counts
on the motion of the United States

are DISMISSED

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall pay to the United States attorney for this district any amount
imposed as a fine, restitution or special assessment The defendant shall pay to the clerk of the court any
amount imposed as a cost of prosecution Until ail fines restitution, special assessments and costs are fully
paid the defendant shall immediately notify the United States attorney for this district of any change in name
and address
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of the court deliver a certified copy of this judgment to the United
States marshal of this district
IX The Court orders commitment to the custody of the Attorney General and recommends
institution be at Lompoc, C A .
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Addendum H

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]
i

MEMORANDUM DECISION

i
i

Criminal No. 961500684
Judge G. Rand Beacham

vs.
LEE E. WALKER,
Defendant.

]

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment and
Motion for New Trial, both of which were originally filed June 18, 1999. Amended motions were
filed November 24,1999, and the Court heard oral argument on December 2, 1999. These motions
present both procedural and substantive issues.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Defendant was found guilty of Securities Fraud and of Money Laundering by a jury verdict
rendered October 21, 1998. A sentencing hearing was held January 21, 1999, at which the Court
stayed imposition of sentence and ordered Defendant to complete supervised probation. The Court's
"Judgment, Stay of Imposition of Sentence, and Order of Probation" was prepared by Plaintiffs
counsel and entered by the Court on February 3, 1999. Defendant's motions were thereafter filed,
as noted above.
Plaintiff argues that both of Defendant's motions are untimely. Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure allows a defendant to file a motion for arrest of judgment at "any time prior to

the imposition of sentence." Rule 24 of the same rules allows a defendant to file a motion for new
trial "within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix
during the ten-day period."
Plaintiff argues that imposition of Defendant's sentence occurred no later than the date on
which the "Judgment, Stay of Imposition of Sentence, and Order of Probation" was entered,1 so that
Defendant's Rule 23 motion was not filed before imposition of sentence and Defendant's Rule 24
motion was notfiledwithin ten days after imposition of sentence. Defendant primarily notes that the
Court stayed the imposition of sentence, so that imposition of sentence has not occurred.
The Court's oral order at the sentencing hearing and its written order both specified that
imposition of sentence as to Defendant was to be "stayed."2 Utah Code Ann. §77-18-l(2)(a) gives
the Court discretion to suspend imposition of sentence and place a defendant on probation without
imposing sentence: "On a . . . conviction of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the
imposition . . . of sentence and place the defendant on probation." Plaintiff relies on Rule 22(c) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, which states that, after conviction of a criminal
offense, "the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction . . . ." Plaintiff
correctly notes that the language of this rule appears to be mandatory.
Read literally, however, Rule 22(c) would eliminate the discretion to suspend imposition of
sentence which is created by the statute and would render the statute meaningless. Plaintiff does not

1

Plaintiff mistakenly states that the date was March 3, 1999.

2

This Court has previously "stayed" imposition of sentence in appropriate cases, but now notes that the
statutory term is "suspend." Utah Code Ann. §77-18-l(2)(a). The Court will endeavor to use the statutory term in
future cases, but, due to the history of this case, must use both terms in this decision.

2

take the rule entirely literally, but does argue that this Court's order staying the imposition of
sentence was, in spite of the clear language of the order, actually the imposition of sentence. This
Court is not persuaded to accept this verbal sleight of hand. Neither was the Court of Appeals, in
its August 19, 1999 Memorandum Decision remitting this case back to this Court; the Court of
Appeals noted that this Court had "stayed imposition of sentence" and stated that "[Defendant] has
not been sentenced." The Court of Appeals correctly stated the facts, and this Court is not persuaded
that, by some process of alchemy, those facts constitute the imposition of sentence.
The Court concludes that Rule 22(c) and §77-18-l(2Xa) are simply in conflict, and that the
Utah Legislature and the Utah Supreme Court have failed to identify and correct this problem.
Neither of the parties to this action has analyzed this conflict or provided the Court with any statutory
or rule-making history upon which the Court could base a decision as to which of the conflicting
statements of law should be prevailing. Furthermore, in the absence of adequate research by the
parties, this Court currently has no law clerk to do the necessary research and has no available time
to do it personally.
On the other hand, the Court has been given no reason to believe that the adoption of Rule
22(c) was intended to eliminate the well-established concept of suspended imposition of sentence,
in spite of the statement of Rule 1(c) that statutes and rules in conflict with the Rules of Criminal
Procedure are "repealed."3 Consequently, the Court will assume that the conflict between the rule

3

Statutes and rules are not properly "repealed" by the simple adoption of new ones and the inclusion of
such a "dragnet" statement as Rule 1(c). The problems in Rules 1(c), 22(c), 23 and 24 all appear, to this Court, to
have resulted from inattentive or incompetent draftsmanship. Unfortunately, this is not uncommon in the drafting
of rules and statutes in the State of Utah.
3

and the statute was inadvertent, and will interpret Rule 22(c) to mean that the Court "shall impose
sentence or order a suspension of the imposition of sentence." In this way, the statutory discretion
to suspend imposition of sentence is preserved.
The Court's order at the sentencing hearing and in writing was a stay or suspension of
imposition of sentence, and not the actual imposition of sentence. With this in mind, Defendant's
Motion for New Trial under Rule 24 was not filed too late, because imposition of sentence has not
yet occurred4 Similarly, Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment under Rule 23 wasfiledbefore
imposition of sentence, which was timely filing Consequently, both motions must be considered.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Rule 24 allows the Court to "grant a new trial in the interest of justice of there is any error
or impropriety which had a substantial adverse eflfect upon the rights of a party." Defendant relies
primarily upon allegations of error or impropriety by the prosecution which were raised and ruled
upon during the trial, but also relies upon issues which were, or should have been, raised and ruled
upon before trial The Court finds nothing in Defendant's current arguments to justify additional
analysis or discussion, and finds that the arguments in Plaintiffs opposing memorandum are
substantially correct. See Plaintiffs "Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion for New Trial
and Motion for Arrest of Judgment," pp. 11-15
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for New Trial is denied.

4

In addition, the Court concludes that the Motion for New Trial was not filed too early; the Court has been
given no reason to conclude that the time limit of Rule 24, "within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or within
such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period," was mtended to fix a ten-day window as the only
time in which such a motion may be filed.

4

MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT
Rule 23 allows the Court to "arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute
a public oflFense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of
judgment." Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment is based on exactly the same assertions as
his Motion for New Trial, and concludes that "the Judgment herein should be arrested and
convictions vacated."
The "Judgment herein" is the Judgment included in the "Judgment, Stay of Imposition of
Sentence, and Order of Probation" entered on February 3,1999. In that Judgment, the Court found,
adjudged and decreed that Defendant was guilty of the two criminal offenses noted above. The
"arrest of judgment" would involve "[t]he act of staying a judgment." Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition. "A stay is a suspension of the case or some designated proceedings within i t . . . . A 'stay'
does not reverse, annul, undo or suspend what already had been done . . . ." Id Consequently,
granting Defendant's motion would stay the enforcement of, and any action based on, the Judgment
against Defendant, pending new charges, new trial or other proceedings. See Rule 23.
Defendant does not claim to be mentally ill, so it is Defendant's burden to demonstrate that
the facts proved or admitted against Defendant do not constitute a public offense or there is other
good cause to arrest the Judgment. To do so, of course, the Court would have to "invade the
province of the jury" and determine that the evidence could not support the jury's verdict and that
the verdict was legally incorrect. The courts generally are willing to do so only in extreme cases, of
course, because the right to trial by jury would otherwise be threatened.

One expression of the

judicial reluctance to overturn a jury verdict is that, before a court should grant a motion to arrest a
5

judgment which was based on a jury verdict, the court must be convinced that "the verdict [was]
based on evidence 'so inherently improbable that no reasonable mind could believe it.'" State v.
Workman. 806 P.2d 1198,

(Utah App. 1991). In addition, the court considering such a motion

must view the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v.
Workman. 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).
In oral argument, Defendant's counsel cited the Court to several pages of the trial transcript
to demonstrate that Defendant' s convictions were based on such inherently improbable evidence. The
Court has reviewed those pages and many others, without reading the entire transcript. The Court
also heard all of the evidence at the trial, of course. After viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, the Court is not persuaded that the evidence on which the jury could
have relied is inherently improbable. The Court finds that PlaintiflF presented evidence which, if
believed by the jury, is clearly sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty on each of the two
charges against Defendant.
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment is denied.
CONCLUSION
Each of Defendant's motions is denied. Counsel for Plaintiff is hereby directed to submit an
appropriate order pursuant to CJA Rule 4-504.
DATED this Q

day of January, 2000.

G. RAND BEACHAM
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
6

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this C?

day of January, 2000,1 provided a true and correct copy

of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION to each of the attorneys named below by placing a
copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah:
Brock Belnap
Deputy Washington County Attorney
David H. T. Wayment
Special Deputy Washington County Attorney
Jim R. Scarth
Scarth & Dent

DEPUTY CLERK OF THE COURT
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.
Criminal No. 961500684
Judge G. Rand Beacham

LEE E. WALKER,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on September 7, 2000 pursuant to Defendant's "Motion
to Enter Conviction Pursuant to UC A 76-3-402 and to Terminate Probation," which was filed August
31, 2000. Defendant asked for a hearing too soon to allow Plaintiff to respond pursuant to normal
rules, but Plaintiffs counsel appeared at the hearing without objection and made arguments.

BACKGROUND
On October 21, 1998, a jury found Defendant guilty of Securities Fraud and Money
Laundering. Securities Fraud is "a felony punishable by a fine of not more than $20,000 and/or
imprisonment of not more than ten years," and Money Laundering is a second degree felony. On
January 21, 1999, this Court stayed imposition of sentence and placed Defendant on supervised
probation for 36 months. One of the terms of Defendant's probation was that he pay restitution in
the amount of $ 100,000, jointly and severally with all other co-defendants, but without any obligation
to pay any amount until after any trial and sentencing of any convicted co-defendants. There has
never been any allegation that Defendant has violated the terms of his probation, although the

Pr}^
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n
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compact of Defendant's probation to the state of his residence, Nevada, has not been particularly
successful. This, however, is not attributable to Defendant.
Defendant now asks this Court to reduce Defendant's convictions to misdemeanors pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402, to terminate Defendant's probation, and tofixDefendant's restitution
obligation at $5000. Plaintiff does not object to a reduction of Defendant's convictions by one
degree, but refuses to consent to a reduction of two degrees. Neither Plaintiff nor Adult Probation
and Parole objects to termination of Defendant's probation, except for a concern that financial
information about Defendant was not obtained through supervision. Plaintiff objects to a change of
Defendant's restitution obligation.
REDUCTION OF CONVICTIONS
At Defendant's sentencing hearing, this Court expressed its findings as to Defendant's
culpability in comparison with other persons involved in the events which led to Defendant's
convictions. Considering the nature and circumstances of Defendant's offenses, this Court still finds
that Defendant has the least culpability of any of those persons involved in the illegal transactions,
and still finds that Defendant received no profit or benefitfromthe illegal transactions. The only codefendant who was charged in this jurisdiction, David Smith, has never reached the trial of his
charges, even though his alleged culpability is much greater than Defendant' s; after several delays due
to changes in Smith's legal counsel, the trial scheduled earlier this month was again continued due
to the hospitalization of Smith's appointed attorney. Consequently, Defendant has been convicted
and has served nearly two years of probation, while his co-defendant still awaits trial. This Court also
finds that Defendant's history and character, though not as spotless as might be hoped, are such that
2

his motion should be seriously considered. Having considered all the information available, this Court
concludes that it would be unduly harsh to record Defendant's convictions for the degree of offense
established by statute. To this extent, Plaintiff does not seriously disagree.
Plaintiff refuses to consent to a reduction more than one degree, however. Plaintiffs consent
is necessary for a reduction of Defendant's offenses to misdemeanors, under the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. §76-3-402(3), which provides
An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless
the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record
that the offense may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an
offense be reduced under this section by more than two degrees.
Defendant asks this Court to find that this statute violates the constitutional principle of
separation of powers, by allowing the prosecutor, who serves in the executive branch of government,
to control a judicial decision about sentencing. This argument has a superficial appeal, because this
Court would in fact order the reduction of Defendant's convictions to class A misdemeanors, but for
the prosecutor's refusal to consent. Defendant provided the Court with only a cursory argument in
support of his motion, however, and cited no specific precedent. Plaintiff simply argued that the
statute should be respected, but has cited only non-controlling precedents on somewhat related issues.
Upon consideration of Defendant's motion, this Court assigned its law clerk to research the
issue. There appears to be no controlling precedent in this State, but the law clerk has identified
several decisions from sister states which bear on the issue. In the view of this Court, the best
reasoning comesfromArizona and California, which have both held that a statute which requires the
prosecutor's assent before an offense is reduced does violate the separation of powers doctrine. In

3

State v. Jones, 689 P.2d 561 (Ariz. App. 1984), the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the
Legislature
cannot give the prosecuting attorney, after a conviction, [the power] to decide what
the punishment shall be. That is a judicial function. [The Arizona statute] was enacted
to mitigate the punishment prescribed by §28-692.01(B) and the decision to mitigate
a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not to the prosecutor.
Id. Further, in State v. Prentiss. 786 P.2d 932 (Ariz. 1989), the Arizona Supreme Court upheld
Jones, stating that Jones made it clear that it is unconstitutional to limit a judge's ability to impose
a mitigated sentence to instances in which the prosecutor makes a post-trial "recommendation." They
stated: "The cornerstone upon which Jones is predicated is that the legislature cannot, through an
executive agent, restrict the judiciary from deciding what a sentence should be." JjL at 935.
The Arizona court recognized that a prosecutor has complete discretion in deciding what
charge to bring, but held that "once the legislature provides the court with the power to use
sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by
empowering the executive branch to review that discretion." Id. See also, State v. Dvkes. 789 P.2d
1082 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (requiring motion by prosecutor before judge could apply lesser sentence
unconstitutionally violates the separation of powers doctrine).
In California, the courts have mainly focused on the fact that, although prosecutors have
discretion to determine what crime to charge, that is the extent of their discretion. They do not hold
the same power after a conviction has been obtained. In People v. Tenorio. 473 P.2d 993, 3 Cal.3d
89 (Cal. 1970), the California Supreme Court addressed a statutory provision which gave the district
attorney the power to preclude a trial courtfromexercising its discretion to strike a prior offense for

4

the purposes of sentencing. In that setting, in which the district attorney's "veto" power was
exercised at the sentencing phase, well after thefilingof the charges, the court concluded that such
an exercise violated the separation of powers doctrine. The court explained:
The judicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes that
a charge should be dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to
exercise the power to dismiss but finds that before he may do so he
must bargain with the prosecutor. The judicial power must be
independent, and a Judge should never be required to pay for its
exercise.
Tenorio, 3 Cal.3d at 94. See also, Estevbar v. Municipal Court, 485 P.2d 1140, 5 Cal. 3d 119 (Cal.
1971); Davis v. Municipal Court, 757 P.2d 11 (Cal. 1988) (following Tenorio and Estevbar): People
v. Superior Court, 520 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1974) (striking down statute giving prosecutor veto power
over trial court's decision to sentence defendant to diversion program).
This Court finds the reasoning in the Arizona and California cases to be very sound and
persuasive. There is no similar precedent in Utah, however. Furthermore, the state of the principle
of separation of powers in Utah is, to this Court, impossible to assess. The competing decisions of
the Utah Supreme Court in In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 961 P.2d 918 (Utah 1998) and In re
Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 1999 UT 6, 976 P.2d 581 have left this Court with serious doubt as to
the viability of the separation of powers principle. Finally, decisions as to the constitutionality of
statutes are generally appropriate and meaningful only in the appellate courts.
Consequently, this Court declines to hold that Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402 is an
unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers principle, but encourages Defendant to appeal
this issue to obtain a definitive decision. This Court grants Defendant's motion to reduce his

5

convictions one degree, and directs counsel for Defendant to submit an appropriate order.
TERMINATION OF PROBATION; RESTITUTION
Due to the absence of allegations of probation violations, and without objectionfromPlaintiff
or Defendant's probation agent, this Court grants Defendant's motion to terminate his supervised
probation. Defendant will remain on bench probation, however, with obligations to violate no laws
and to pay restitution as previously ordered, until the issue of restitution is resolved. This Court
denies Defendant's motion to reduce his restitution obligation, but may reconsider such a motion after
the resolution of the charges against the co-defendant, David Smith. Counsel for Defendant is hereby
directed to submit an appropriate order.
DATED thifr^M day of October, 2000.

(S^y^ fc*v.

G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this £& day oiQcX

, 2000,1 provided a true and correct copy

of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION to each of the parties/attorneys named below by
placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St.
George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and
addressed as follows:
Brock Belnap
Deputy Washington County Attorney
David Wayment
Attorney for Plaintiff
160 East 300 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Harold J. Dent, Jr.
Attorney for Defendant

DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
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Addendum J

INSTRUCTION NO. Vb&

Before you canfindthe defendant guilty of the crime of Securities Fraud as charged in Count
I of the Second Amended Information, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable coubt,
all of the following elements of the crime:
1.

That the defendant Lee E Walker,

2.

Acting willfully,

3

On or about October 18, 1994 (although the exact date is immaterial),

4.

In connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a security,

5.

Directly or indirectly did either of the following:
(a)

Made any untrue statement of a material fact,

Or
(b)

Omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading.

If you find that the evidence establishes each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt,
it is your duty tofindthe defendant guilty. If youfindthat the evidence fails to establish one or more
of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

1

^

You are instructed that while a number of representations and omissions are alleged as
the basis for the charge of securities fraud, it is not incumbent upon the state to prove each and
every one of them. It is enough that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a false
statement or material omission was made in connection with the offer or sale of the security.

INSTRUCTION NO. 15

When you retire to deliberate, you should appoint one of yourselves to act as the chairperson
to preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you all agree. The chairperson has
no more power than any other juror.
In this criminal case your verdict must be unanimous. You may not reach a verdict by
drawing straws, byflippinga coin or by a majority vote. Instead, your verdict must represent the
careful and conscientious judgment of each of you and all of you.
Your verdict must be in writing, and it must be returned to the court. A verdict form has been
prepared for your use in this case. Your chairperson will sign that verdict which correctly sets forth
your decision. It is not necessary for anyone other than the chairperson to sign your verdict.
When you have arrived at a verdict, the chairperson should knock on the door to the jury
room to notify the bailiff that you are ready to report to the court.

Addendum K

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

LEE WALKER
Plaintiff

David Wayment/Brock

VS

Defendant
J. Scarth

Belnap

Attorney for Defendant

Attorney for Plaintiff
Case No.

DATE
961500684

10/19/98
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